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TIME, OBSERVABLES, AND STRUCTURE
ABSTRACT: In this chapter I consider what recent work on background independent physics can do
for structuralism, and what structuralism can do for background independent physics. I focus on the
problems of time and observables in gravitational physics. The ‘frozen’ character of the observables
of general relativity is usually considered to constitute a serious problem for the theory. I argue that
by invoking correlations between physical quantities we can provide a natural explanation of the
appearance of time and change in timeless structures. I argue that this response can resolve a problem
with Max Tegmark’s ‘extreme structuralist’ position. I then consider what bearing the mathematical
representation used (namely Rovelli’s framework of ‘partial’ and ‘complete’ observables) has on the
debate over the nature of structure in discussions of structural realism (i.e. the question of how struc-
tures are to be conceived). I argue that it has both the resources to ground the notion of structure in
physics and to answer the ‘no relations without relata’ objection.1
1
MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURE AND REALITY
Mathematics, broadly speaking, is the science of patterns. Physics, broadly speak-
ing, is the search for patterns in the natural world. Eugene Wigner’s [16] famous
conundrum concerning the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the nat-
ural sciences” constitutes an expression of puzzlement over the empirical success
of physics, based as it is on mathematics.2 Put this way, of course, the problem
has a rather simple answer: mathematics (the science of patterns) is so effective
because the natural world (the subject matter of physics) is itself patterned. The
regularities of physics are but instances of mathematical structures. For example,
we can apply geometry to physical space because physical space has a structure
that is (more or less) isomorphic to some geometrical structure (or a sequence of
such structures, in the case of evolving 3-geometries, or geometrodynamics). We
might, in somewhat different terms (and ignoring complications to do with repre-
sentation), view our world as a model of the axioms of some systems of geometry
(and of the axioms of quantum field theory, say—though this latter connection is
rather more debatable).
However, the problem is really an old one, and there are some old solutions
too. Pythagoras claimed, similarly, that there was no real distinction between
‘the world of physics’ and ‘the world of mathematics’. Plato argued there was
a very great difference: it amounted to concrete versus abstract, a distinction de-
nied by Pythagoras. For Plato, of course, the concrete, physical world instantiated
1This chapter was originally written for the FQXi’s Nature of Time essay competition (http://
www.fqxi.org/community/essay/winners/2008.1#Rickles). I thank FQXi for permission to
reproduce the essay (albeit in modified form) here.
2As he puts it: “the mathematical formulation of the physicist’s often crude experience leads in an
uncanny number of cases to an amazingly accurate description of a large class of phenomena” ([16], p.
230).
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(or ‘partook of’) the abstract forms (albeit imperfectly). This Platonic account is
somewhat similar to the model-based view presented above.
More recently structural realists have answered the question about the effective-
ness of mathematics by arguing that the empirical sciences are about the discovery
of structural aspects of the world, and these structural aspects are of a mathemat-
ical nature (or, at least, of a kind that submit to mathematical representations).3
Radical ‘ontic’ structural realists turn this in to an all out ontological claim: sci-
ence is about structure; scientific theories encode structural information about the
world; and structure is all there is. In this way, structural realists aim to provide




Max Tegmark [14] has recently extended this basic structural realist idea by com-
bining it with something like David Lewis’ extreme brand of modal realism [6].
Not only is there the structure we observe (which is mathematical), there exist
mathematical structures of all possible types! We have here, then, an extreme case
of the principle of plenitude. Why would one ever wish to go to this extreme? To
explain the nature and existence of the structure we observe. The laws (structure)
of our universe are by no means necessary and so demand some explanation for
why they are thus rather than so. Tegmark answers this question with absolute
proliferation: our world is a mathematical structure in a multiverse of all possible
structures. Interestingly, in one sense, though the structure we inhabit (and are,
ourselves, part of) is itself contingent4, the existence of the structure we inhabit
is in another sense necessary, since (being an instance of an eternal mathematical
structure) it will be a possible world relative to all other worlds.
The maximal multiplicity of possible worlds, then, is utilized to ground a the-
ory of everything that does not face problems of creation ex nihilo: mathematical
structures are timeless, they are not the kinds of thing that can be created and de-
stroyed. One can then, if one is so inclined, invoke an anthropic explanation of
why we find ourselves in this particular mathematical structure. This is, admit-
tedly, a hard view to swallow! However, if one wishes to explain why there is
something rather than nothing (surely the ultimate explanandum?), then I see no
3Though not all structural realists would go this far. Some, for example, would prefer to say that
structure is physical, and that there might be biological and social structures that are not necessarily
mathematical. However, the recent trends are towards extending structural realism across the entire
domain of science, including biology [5] and economics [12]. The distinction between ‘physical’ and
‘mathematical,’ if it can be established at all, is not quite as simple as it might seem prima facie—see
Rickles [8] for a discussion of this difficulty in the context of string theory.
4For example, one can conceive of the laws being different, and indeed, as in David Lewis’ theory,
the existence of a plurality of structures of the sort described can provide the machinery to ground such
possibilities.
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other alternative than to propose such curious-sounding theories as the invoking
of eternally existing structures. If we are willing to accept this, then we are led to
a belief in many types of (consistent) structure. If we are then further willing to
view our world as one of these structures (i.e. literally a mathematical structure),
then combined with the necessary anthropics, we have an explanation of what is
often considered to be an insurmountable problem.
The major problematic step (by no means the only one), I take it, is that one
requiring that we believe our world (ourselves included) is a mathematical struc-
ture. All aspects of reality in our world would have to be reconceptualized in terms
of such structure.5 The common reaction to such a view bears similarities to Dr
Johnson’s attempted refutation of Berkeley’s idealism by the kicking of a rock.
In this case, the objection is that the world does not seem to be anything like a
mathematical structure: mathematical structures are abstract and physical reality
is concrete (whereupon you are invited to notice that there are spatiotemporally lo-
cated, impermanent solid objects on which one could stub one’s toe). But we have
no way of knowing what it is like to be a mathematical structure: it could, after all,
be just like this! Moreover, given our present knowledge of spacetime (on which
more later), the idea that spatiotemporal location is such that it can serve to play
so crucial a role as demarcating abstract from concrete seems absurd: the chrono-
metrical structure of spacetime (including locations, conceived of as complexes of
events) are themselves dynamically determined by laws of general relativity.
However, given this dynamical determination of spacetime structure, there are
real problems in attempting to account for certain observed aspects of the world;
time and change being cases in point. The world certainly appears to undergo
change, and this, we usually (i.e. with our philosophy hats off) assume, must
happen in time. How can time and change be part of a mathematical structure given
that such structures are immutable and eternal? In the case of general relativity the
structures appear to directly represent a world without time and change since the
symmetries of the theory imply a zero Hamiltonian which, in the quantized theory,
leads to a non-evolving Schro¨dinger equation.
In the remainder of this chapter I argue that recent work on problems of time
and change in classical and quantum gravity can be brought to bear on the matter
resulting in a satisfactory resolution. To deploy a Wheelerism, they show how one
can have time without time. We can give an account (or, at least the outline of an
account) of our world, qua mathematical structure, that at a fundamental level does
not contain time. This account makes use of structuralism in a direct way. Thus,
the account I present can be usefully incorporated into Tegmark’s theory—or what
5Related to this is the problem of equivalent mathematical structures that correspond to distinct
physical situations. In other words, one and the same structure can be taken to represent very different
systems. I don’t see this to be as problematic as it is sometimes taken to be. If there are indeed
differences in the physical systems, then though we can indeed, in many cases, represent them using
the same mathematical structure (for example, the Navier-Stokes equations can be applied to all manner
of prima facie very different systems), that does not thereby mean that the systems would not have some
other structures more closely corresponding to them. Any physical difference would simply mean that
there ought to be a structural difference too, so long as we use a fine enough resolution of the structure.
4 DEAN RICKLES
I shall call “ultrastructuralism”—in order to defuse a major potential problem. As a
bonus, as I mentioned above, one can extract a more physically motivated account
of what structure is (at least in the context of physics).
3
TIME AND SYMMETRY
The universe, as a single object, is usually modelled as a four dimensional struc-
ture (a Lorentzian 4-geometry).6 This structure is naturally changeless: change
happens within the universe, from one hypersurface (3-geometry) to another (with
the time variable chosen arbitrarily on account of general covariance). At least,
within our world it seems to be constructed in this way; the laws of general relativ-
ity themselves do not completely constrain the topology of space, and do not even
constrain the dimensionality of the manifold.
Of course, general relativity leads us to view spacetime geometry as part of a
coupled dynamical system, as something that satisfies equations of motion and co-
evolves with matter and radiation. But clearly the evolution here cannot be under-
stood in an ordinary temporal sense, unless we have at our disposal some external
time parameter against which to understand it. An alternative is to attempt to con-
coct some ‘internal’ parameter from the dynamical degrees of freedom that can
then parametrize the evolution. The former ‘external’ parameter simply doesn’t
make sense in the context of general relativity. The internal parameter approach
does not make sense at a global level, but local times can be established using ap-
propriate invariants. However, even here, the notion of systems evolving against
coordinate time is inappropriate: the time that emerges is a dynamical construction
from events.
This, in a nutshell, is the problem of time in general relativity: spacetime ge-
ometry is a dynamical variable, but clearly the dynamics cannot be understood
in the usual sense (that is, as involving an external time parameter). The prob-
lem is worse than this, however, and can trickle down from global (involving the
universe as a whole and a timelessness that is fairly innocuous) to local (involving
timelessness and changelessness of the states and observables within the universe).
At the root of this problem is the symmetry group of general relativity, the group
of four-dimensional diffemorphisms of the spacetime manifold. Diffeomorphism
invariance makes local observables (i.e. observables sitting at spacetime points or
within regions of spactime) an impossibility, for the equations of motion (of gen-
erally relativistic theories) are invariant with respect to diffeomorphisms that shift
the points and regions about. Since there clearly are (in some sense) localized
degrees of freedom, and these are what we observe (and that seem to evolve), we
need some notion of local observable that does not make reference to the spacetime
manifold but that fits our experience. That is, we need a background independent
6To this we might add various geometric object fields representing the observed matter and radia-
tion.
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notion of observable that does not utilize external spatial and temporal parameters,
for changes with respect to these will be symmetries of the theory.
A popular response is to use physical degrees of freedom to define observables
and evolution. This can be understood as one kind of implementation of the ‘inter-
nalist’ strategy mentioned above. The observables so ‘localized’ are relational in
the sense that they are not defined on a background space but only relative to other
dynamical entities (matter fields, spatial volume, etc.). Observables are not of the
form A (x, t) (where x and t label an independent manifold) but A (B) (where
B is another observable and neither B nor A is privileged in any sense). One
can then consider the relative evolution of such observables, looking at the way
in which changes in the value of one are correlated with changes in the value of
the other. This approach can give us notions of time and change that emerge as a
consequence of functional relations between elements of a mathematical structure.
However, this is to oversimplify matters: in order to properly appreciate the nature
of this problem, and the suggested resolution7 I need to quickly cover the entan-
gled concepts of gauge and constraints. I can then introduce Rovelli’s framework
for constructing suitably invariant observables, for constrained (gauge) systems,
and show how it provides a structuralist response to the problem of time that can




The problems of time and change sketched above are aspects of the fact that gen-
eral relativity is a gauge theory—its Hamiltonian formulation is given by con-
straints. The “gauge” here simply refers to the freedom in choosing coordinates
used to parametrize space so that choosing a particular coordinate system amounts
to choosing a gauge. Physical quantities are those that are independent of such a
gauge choice. We give a very rough and ready presentation of these ideas here—
for more details (in the context of the problem of time), see [11].
The diffeomorphism symmetry mentioned above affects the dynamics so that a
standard Hamiltonian or Lagrangian formulation of the theory is not possible. Re-
spectively, the canonical variables, q and p, are not all independent (being required
to satisfy identities known as constraints: φ(q, p) = 0) and the Euler-Lagrange
equations are not all independent. These identities serve to ‘constrain’ the set of
phase space points that represent genuine physical possibilities: only those points
7This view has been defended by a variety of authors; most notably Bryce DeWitt and Carlo Rovelli.
Here I adopt Rovelli’s ‘partial’ and ‘complete’ observables formalism [13]. See [11] for a general
review of the problem of time and proposed solutions.
8I restrict the discussion to classical systems in order to make the presentation easier to follow. For
the technically savvy, one can transform to the quantum case, roughly, by thinking of the functional
relation or correlationA (B) as representing the expectation values ofA relative to the eigenvalues of
B.
6 DEAN RICKLES
satisfying the constraints do so, and these form a subset in the full phase space
known as the ‘constraint surface’. This has a direct impact on the form of the
observables. Since a pair of dynamical variables (not observables) that differ by
a gauge transformation are indistinguishable, corresponding to one and the same
physical state of affairs (the defining characteristic of a gauge transformation), the
observables ought to register this fact too: that is, the observables of a gauge the-
ory should be insensitive to differences amounting to a gauge transformation—as
should the states in any quantization of such a theory: i.e. if x is related to y by a
change of gauge, then states Ψ must satisfy the gauge condition that Ψ(x)≈Ψ(y),
where we use Dirac’s ‘weak’ equality, “≈”, to denote identity on the constraint
surface.9
More explicitly, where ‘A ’ is a dynamical variable, ‘O’ is the set of (genuine)
observables, x,y are states (represented by points on the constraint surface), and
‘∼’ denotes gauge equivalence, we can express this as:
(1) A ∈ O ⇐⇒ (x∼ y)⊃ (A (x)≈A (y))
Or, equivalently, we can say that the genuine observables are those dynamical
variables that are constant on gauge orbits ‘[x]’ (where [x] = {y : y∼ x}):
(2) ∀[x] , A ∈ O ⇐⇒ A [x] = const.
Most of the work done on constructing the observables of general relativity is done
using the 3 + 1 projection of the spacetime Einstein equations. That is, the con-
straints are understood as conditions laid down on the initial data 〈Σ,h,K〉 when
we project the spacetime solution onto a spacelike hypersurface Σ—here, h is a
Riemannian metric on Σ and K is the extrinsic curvature on Σ; note that this for-
mulation has since been superseded by a representation in terms of Wilson loops
and their conjugate momenta (namely, fluxes). I won’t go into the nitty gritty de-
tails here, but it turns out that the Hamiltonian of general relativity is a sum of
constraints on this initial data (of the kind that generate gauge motions, namely 1st
class)—hence, the dynamics is entirely generated by constraints and is therefore
pure gauge. There is no evolution in time. This is the technical expression of the
problems posed above and makes perfect sense if one thinks of time evolution as
a diffeomorphism generating the shifting of data from one slice to another.
This formulation allows us to connect up the characterization of the observables
to the dynamics (generated by constraints, abbreviated toHi) more explicitly:
(3) A ∈ O ⇐⇒ {O,Hi} ≈ 0 ∀i
In other words, the observables of the theory are those functions that have weakly
vanishing (i.e. on the constraint surface) Poisson brackets with all of the (first-
9It seems that Einstein might have been aware of this implication soon after completing his theory
of general relativity, for he writes that “the connection between quantities in equations and measurable
quantities is far more indirect than in the customary theories of old” ([4], p. 71).
TIME, OBSERVABLES, AND STRUCTURE 7
class) constraints.10 These are the physical, gauge-invariant quantities: evolving
with the constraints (the dynamics) does not generate a physically distinct state but
simply changes the gauge.
A pressing problem in general relativity—especially pressing for constructing a
quantum theory of gravity—is to find suitable entities that satisfy this formal def-
inition. There are at least two types that fit the bill, both non-local in some way:
(1) global quantities defined over the whole spacetime11 and (2) ‘relational’ quan-
tities built out of correlations between field values and/or invariants. There seems
to be some consensus forming that the latter type are the way to go, and these will
serve as the appropriate vehicle for defining time in an unchanging mathematical
structure, as well as defining the structures themselves.
5
COMPLETE OBSERVABLES AS STRUCTURAL CORRELATIONS
John Earman calls quantities of the form A (B) “coincidence occurrences”.12 As
he explains, “a coincidence occurrence consists in the corealization of values of
pairs of (non-gauge invariant) dynamical quantities” ([2], p. 16). Earman thinks
that this new conception of physical quantities signals the necessity of a shift from
the traditional ‘subject-predicate’-based ontologies, such as substantivalism and
relationalism. I think this is the right thing to say, and have argued for and devel-
oped this point elsewhere (see [9; 10; 11]). It bears a striking resemblance to the
version of structuralism espoused by Eddington:
any conception of structure (as opposed to substance) must be analysable into a complex of relations
and relata, the relata having no structural significance except as the meeting point of several relations,
and the relations having no significance except as connecting and ordering the relata. ([3], p. 121)
However, I spell it out rather differently. Rovelli’s framework of partial and com-
plete observables—developed in [13]—provides, I think, the perfect formal frame-
work in which to ground the conceptual framework.
• A partial observable is a physical quantity to which we can associate a mea-
surement leading to a number
• A complete observable is defined as a quantity whose value (or probability
distribution) can be predicted by the relevant theory.
10There are two types of constraint in general relativity: the Hamiltonian (or scalar) constraint and
the momentum (or vector) constraint. These can be understood as encoding indeterminacy about ‘when
and where’ some quantity is measured.
11There is a proof (for the case of closed vacuum solutions of general relativity) that there can be no
local observables at all [15], where ‘local’ here means that the observable is constructed as a spatial
integral of local functions of the initial data and their derivatives.
12We might also call them “Kretschmann observables” since they stem from Kretschmann’s objec-
tion to general covariance later incorporated into Einstein’s own ‘point-coincidence’ argument.
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Partial observables are taken to coordinatize an extended configuration space Q
and complete observables coordinatize an associated (physical) reduced phase
space Γred . The “predictive content” of some dynamical theory is then given by
the kernel of the map f :Q×Γred →Rn. This space gives the kinematics of a the-
ory and the dynamics is given by the constraints, φ(qa, pa) = 0, on the associated
extended phase space T ∗Q.
The content appears to be this: there are quantities that can be measured whose
values are not predicted by the theory. Yet the theory is deterministic (modulo
quantum theoretic probabilities) because it does predict correlations between par-
tial observables (i.e. complete observables). The dynamics is then spelt out in
terms of relations between partial observables. Hence, the theory formulated in
this way describes relative evolution of (non-gauge invariant) variables as func-
tions of each other. No variable is privileged as the independent one (cf. [7], p.
5). The dynamics concerns the relations between elements of the space of partial
observables, and though the individual elements do not have a well defined evolu-
tion, relations between them (i.e. correlations) do, and in such a way as to remain
independent of coordinate space and time.
The interpretation vis-a´-vis time is as follows: let φ = T be a partial observable
parametrizing the ticks of a clock (laid out across a gauge orbit), and let f = a
be another partial observable (also spanning a gauge orbit). Both are non-gauge
invariant quantities. A gauge invariant quantity, a complete observable, can (here
borrowing from [1]) be constructed from these partial observables as:
(4) A[ f ;T ](τ,x) = f (x′)
These quantities encode correlations. They tell us what the value of a non-gauge
invariant function f is when, under the flow with respect to the vector field gen-
erated by the constraint, the non-gauge invariant function T takes on the value τ .
This correlation is gauge invariant. These are the kinds of quantity that a back-
ground independent gauge theory like general relativity is all about. We don’t talk
about the value of the gravitational field at a point of the manifold, but where some
other physical quantity (say, a value of the electromagnetic field) takes on a cer-
tain value. In this sense, this formal framework codifies Eddington’s earlier views,
and also Earman’s characterisation of coincidence occurrences.13 I prefer to think
of the complete observables as primitive structural correlations that are reducible
only in unphysical ways (corresponding to distinct gauge choices).
6
13Once again, we find that Einstein was surprisingly modern-sounding on this point, writing that “the
gravitational field at a certain location represents nothing ‘physically real,’ but the gravitational field
together with other data does” ([4], p. 71). Likewise, the “other data” will represent nothing without
yet more data (such as the gravitational field). The correlations are the fundamental things.
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RELATIONS WITHOUT RELATA
Let us return to the issue of structuralism. Epistemic structural realists argue that
the best we can hope for is to get to know structural aspects of the world, since
we only ever get to observe relational rather than intrinsic properties (in our ex-
periments and so on). However, in a background independent gauge theory like
general relativity we have seen that the physical observables just are relational
quantities: this is all there is! One cannot even speak of an independent spacetime.
Hence, the notion of a non-relational quantity, defined at a point of spacetime, is
physically incoherent, though we can provide a purely formal expression of the
notion in terms of gauge variant coordinate-dependent quantities.
In other words, there’s nothing ‘underneath’ the relational properties (as en-
coded in the ‘overlapping’ dynamical fields), so that these exhaust what there is,
leading to an ontological structuralism motivated entirely by the proper concep-
tualisation (and formalisation) of general relativity. Hence, we have here an em-
pirical argument for ontic structural realism that evades the standard ‘no relations
without relata’ objection. The relations are the correlations here (the gauge in-
variant, complete observables), and the ‘relata’ would be the non-gauge invariant,
partial observables. But the partial observables being non-gauge invariant do not
correspond to physical reality: only the complete observables do. Partial observ-
ables correspond to an arbitrary choice of gauge that can be transformed away.
We cannot decompose the correlations in an ontological sense, though we clearly
can in a epistemic or formal sense—indeed, the correlates constitute our ‘access
points’ to the more fundamental, physical correlations. We talk about correlations
in terms of quantities that are correlated. But there is a clear ontological division
between the status of partial observables (i.e. relata) and complete observables (i.e.
relations). This is, then, precisely why we face problems regarding the ‘subject-
predicate’-style ontologies that Earman mentions: there are no independent sub-
jects that are the ‘bearers’ of properties and the ‘enterers’ of relations. We can
seemingly invoke such subjects in our representations, but it is mere artifice.
What is interesting about this version of ontic structural realism is its indepen-
dence from standard philosophy of science issues. We do not need to ground the
position in the underdetermination of theory by data or the problem of ontological
revisions at the level of objects. The method of motivation is entirely internal to
the interpretation of mature physical theory.
7
CONCLUSION
The position I have described involves the idea that physical systems (which I take
to be characterized by the values for their observables) are exhausted by extrinsic
or relational properties: they have no intrinsic, local properties at all! This is a curi-
ous consequence of background independence coupled with gauge invariance and
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leads to a rather odd picture in which objects and structure are deeply entangled.
Inasmuch as there are objects at all, any properties they possess are structurally
conferred: they have no reality outside some correlation. What this means is that
the objects don’t ground the structure; they are nothing independently of the struc-
ture, which takes the form of a (gauge-invariant) correlation between (non-gauge
invariant) field values. With this view one can both evade the standard ‘no rela-
tions without relata’ objection and the problem of accounting for the appearance
of time (in a timeless structure) in the same way.
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